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Abstract. Online fraud poses a relatively new threat to the revenues of
companies. A way to detect and prevent fraudulent behavior is with the
use of specific machine learning (ML) techniques. These anomaly detec-
tion techniques have been thoroughly studied, but the level of employ-
ment is not as high. The airline industry suffers from fraud by parties
such as online travel agencies (OTAs). These agencies are commissioned
by an airline carrier to sell its travel tickets. Through policy violations,
they can illegitimately claim some of the airline’s revenue by offering
cheaper fares to customers.
This research applies several anomaly detection techniques to detect
fraudulent behavior by OTAs and assesses their strengths and weak-
nesses. Since the data is not labeled, it is not known whether fraud has
actually occurred. Therefore, unsupervised ML is used. The contributions
of this paper are, firstly, to show how to shape the online booking data
and how to engineer new and relevant features. Secondly, this research
includes a case study in which domain experts evaluate the detection
performance of the considered ML methods by classifying a set of 75
bookings. According to the experts’ analysis, the techniques are able to
discover previously unknown fraudulent bookings, which will not have
been found otherwise. This demonstrates that anomaly detection is a
valuable tool for the airline industry to discover fraudulent behavior.
Keywords: Fraud · Anomaly detection · Unsupervised learning ·
Airline · Online travel agent
1 Introduction
Since industries have expanded their services to the internet to reach more cus-
tomers, new ways have evolved to claim part of a company’s revenue. Aviation
faces a considerable problem with these malpractices. In 2008, airline industries
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all over the world missed out on 1.4 billion US dollars due to fraud. This was
around 1.3% of their total revenue, although the rates were up to 4% in parts
such as the Middle East and Latin America. Nowadays, these figures are expected
to be even higher [1]. One of the conductors of fraud in the airline industry are
online travel agencies (OTAs). Such an agency specializes in selling travel prod-
ucts including flights, hotels and rental cars to customers online. There is a wide
variety of different kinds of OTAs, but they share at least one similarity: they all
have an agency agreement with the supplier to resell its products [2]. In this case,
the airline carrier allows the OTA access to its booking system to sell airplane
seats. This expands the reach of the carrier, and therefore, increases its revenue.
However, some OTAs violate the policies conducted by the airline organization
in order to get access to cheaper ticket fares. This is possible, because an air-
plane seat can have a different price depending on several well-known factors.
These include the seat’s class (economy or business), the flight destination and
the remaining time until departure. More specifically, when a flight consists of
multiple flight segments, the price of a single segment can differ depending on
the other segments in the complete flight. Here, a flight segment can be seen
as the part between the departure and arrival of an airplane. If it lands more
than once, there are multiple flight segments. An OTA can add one or more
artificial segments to a flight to possibly get access to relatively lower prices.
Later on, it can cancel these segments, which leads to revenue loss for the airline
company. Therefore, the airline carrier desires to discover these malpractices to
avoid losing profit.
In general, fraudulent behavior is assumed to be unusual, and hence, (largely)
deviates from the expected, normal behavior. A way to discover such anomalous
behavior is with the use of outlier detection techniques. Usually, the data with
potentially fraudulent behavior is unlabeled, suggesting the use of unsupervised
machine learning (unsupervised ML). This can be applied in a wide variety of
domains, such as insurance, health care and cyber-security, with the same goal
of finding malicious activities in data [3]. However, most of the applications
are to discover and prevent bank fraud. For example, Bolton et al. propose the
use of unsupervised profiling methods to detect credit card fraud in financial
transactions on a customer-based level [4], while Ferdousi et al. examine the
occurrence of fraud in stock market data as anomalous behavior in an evolving
time series [5].
In the airline industry, the data consists of flight bookings, which can be
seen as customer-based data changing through time. However, there are some
important differences between bookings and financial transactions. First of all,
customers are usually not aware of an OTA conducting fraud and are not directly
affected by it. Fraud can even be advantageous to the customer who can purchase
a cheaper flight ticket. Furthermore, a booking can be fraudulent because of how
it changes through time, in contrast with fraud in a single financial transaction.
Lastly, OTAs are part of the business model and are necessary for the airline
carrier to make a profit. Of course, the majority of them act sincerely.
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Since the airline industry has some characteristics which set it apart from
other fields in which fraud occurs, it is interesting to examine how anomaly
detection methods perform. More importantly, we were not able to find liter-
ature on the detection of fraudulent behavior of OTAs. This paper addresses
that research gap. The contributions of our research are, firstly, to show how
three different algorithms are applied to the booking data of OTAs to discover
violations of the policies conducted by the airline carrier. This allows us not
only to eventually block fraudulent bookings, but this can also enrich domain
experts with new knowledge on how to avoid malicious behavior from happening.
Before the techniques are applied, practically usable data is constructed from
raw booking datasets. To this end, existing features are modified and new vari-
ables are added. Secondly, we show the importance of the engineered features in
discovering fraudulent bookings. An evaluation set of 90 bookings is constructed
for domain experts to classify as normal or fraudulent. We assess how well the
anomaly detection methods are able to find these fraudulent observations.
2 Data
The data used in this research was obtained from an airline company. It has sev-
eral kinds of features. The first type is based on the passengers’ travel require-
ments information, summarized as a passenger booking. It consists of features
such as travel dates, travel routes, ticket information and associated OTAs for
all flights planned for the coming 360 days. There were some observations with
missing values for some of the features. It was decided not to remove all of
them, since having missing values in certain fields could be related to fraud-
ulent behavior of OTAs. Missing information could be due to an error in the
reservation system, which could have been exploited by an OTA. The second
type of features contains information about revenue for each created booking.
Actual revenue data is only available for ticketed (paid) reservations, while it is
estimated for non-ticketed reservations using historical revenue data. The third
type of variables is directed at the OTAs themselves. It provides characteristics
such as an unique identifier and their location (or market).
The goal is to find fraudulent bookings and the corresponding OTAs which
violate the policies of the airline carrier. The observations in this raw dataset
were given on a flight segment level, but the data needs to be booking-based,
i.e., each observation should indicate a booking. Therefore, the flight segments
corresponding to the same booking had to be merged.
3 Methods
In this section, we discuss how the segment-based raw data was merged and how
new variables were constructed from the raw features. Furthermore, we provide
a preliminary analysis of the data and introduce which ML techniques were used
for the experiments. Lastly, we discuss some transformations that were applied
to the dataset with the goal to improve the results.
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3.1 Feature Engineering
Before the experiments were carried out, new variables which better represent
the underlying characteristics of the data were extracted from the raw features
which were described in Sect. 2. They can be categorized into two classes: (i)
revenue-based features, and (ii) booking-based features.
Revenue-Based Features. The first category of features was derived from the
variables containing revenue information. These new features were introduced to
describe the relative amount of revenue generated per booking and to compare
the expected revenue with the ticketed revenue received. The predictions in rev-
enue were based on a historical horizon of fifteen days, which was advised by
domain experts. They expected the majority of the changes to occur during this
time window. Moreover, the predicted minimum and maximum revenue were
added as features and a feature describing the changes in revenue over the time
horizon was included. A relatively large difference between the predicted maxi-
mum and actual revenue could indicate malicious booking behavior. Since these
new features were obtained per flight segment, the records corresponding to the
same booking were aggregated (by taking both the sum and average) to obtain
one observation for each feature per booking. Furthermore, the ticketing time
and a feature describing the variation in ticketing times for the flight segment
were included. The ticketing time is the time it takes before a booking has been
paid for. When a flight is legitimately booked online, the payment is expected
to be done directly for the whole flight, and hence, there should be no or only
a small variation in the ticketing times of the flight segments. A relatively large
variation could indicate fraudulent behavior.
Booking-Based Features. The second class of features was composed from
the raw booking features. These new features do not only describe the important
characteristics of the booking, but they also represent the OTA providing the
flight ticket. As mentioned before, flight segments corresponding to the same
booking were aggregated to obtain one observation per booking. A new feature
of interest is point of commencement (PoC) circumvention. This feature checks
whether the effective PoC is equal to the true PoC. Here, the effective PoC
is the starting point the passenger is expected to depart from, while the true
PoC is the actual starting point. PoC circumvention occurs when a fake flight
segment is added to a booking to get access to a cheaper fare. Before the airplane
departs, this flight segment is canceled while the lower flight price is retained.
A difference between the effective and true PoC of a booking coincides with one
or more cancellations or additions of flight segments, so features were added
which explicitly indicate this behavior. This was done by comparing booking
data on successive days and by calculating the differences in the number of
flight segments in each booking. Furthermore, variables which indicate whether
an OTA chronologically books flight segments (from first departure until last
arrival) were included. These features are directly linked to policy violations.
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Lastly, several other features were composed which capture other booking related
data, such as the number of passengers in a booking, the length of stay, number
of days between cancellations, and so on.
Final Dataset. After the feature engineering process, the final dataset consists
of P = 84 numerical features on N = 17,886 unique bookings. The total number
of unique OTAs is 158. Now, anomalies can be found on a booking level. Each
booking is connected to an OTA, making it possible to find the agencies which
were potentially conducting fraud.
3.2 Feature Analysis
Before the ML algorithms were applied, a preliminary feature analysis on fifteen
days of data was performed. The purpose of this study is to give an insight into
the booking data in the considered airline market and to examine what fraud-
ulent behavior of an OTA could be. The features of interest in this exploratory
study were those which are concerned with PoC circumvention.
Table 1. Number of flight segments in six different bookings for the past fifteen days.
Booking Days from now into the past
14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
1 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 6 6 6 6 6
2 6 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 6 6 6
3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6
4 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 6
5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 2 2 2
6 6 6 7 7 6 6 6 6 6 7 7 6 6 6 6
To this end, the cancellations made in the bookings were examined. Table 1
shows the adjustments made in several bookings. These modifications were not
just caused by cancellations, but also by the addition of new flight segments.
This occurs in, for example, the last row. It shows an increase in the number of
flight segments on day 12 and a decrease (cancellation) two days later on day 10,
which is odd. This process repeats itself on day 5. It is unlikely that a passenger
made such adjustments. A deeper analysis of a booking with canceled flight
segments is shown in Table 2. Here, the two tables represent the same booking,
but on different days. Note that the first two rows on the first day are not
present on the second day anymore: these flight segments have been canceled. It
is interesting to note that the values of the second column, the segment identifier,
were not adjusted when flight segments were deleted. After examining this for
several bookings with cancellations, it was concluded that the segment identifier
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Table 2. Description of a particular booking on the first and second day. The columns
indicate the departure date, segment identifier, departure location, arrival location,
effective PoC, true PoC, and PoC circumvention, respectively.
Dep. day Seg. ID Dep. loc. Arr. loc. Eff. PoC True PoC PoC circumv.
Booking properties on day 1
0 1 L1 L2 NA PoC1 NA
0 2 L2 L3 NA PoC1 NA
5 3 L3 L4 NA PoC1 NA
5 4 L4 L1 PoC1 PoC1 0
Booking properties on day 2
5 3 L3 L4 NA PoC2 NA
5 4 L4 L1 PoC1 PoC2 1
Table 3. Overview of the descriptive statistics in the PoC features.
Description Value
Percentage of PoC circumvented flight segments 7.27%
Number of unique effective PoCs 115
Number of unique true PoCs 138
was never modified. Hence, unexpected behavior in that variable could indicate
this kind of fraud.
An overview of descriptive PoC characteristics is given in Table 3. Here, the
percentage of flight segments with PoC circumvention is around 7%. Moreover,
the table shows that the number of unique true POCs is greater than the number
of effective PoCs. This difference indicates that there are at least 23 locations
being used to circumvent the availability.
3.3 Anomaly Detection Techniques
Three anomaly detection techniques were considered in this research: isolation
forest, one-class Support Vector Machine, and k-means clustering, which are
explained in this section. These methods were chosen such that a wide variety
of anomaly detection techniques was considered. Since no labeled data is avail-
able, unsupervised methods were used. They assume that the majority of the
observations is normal, while only a small fraction is abnormal. This is the case
for fraudulent bookings in the airline industry.
Isolation Forest. The first unsupervised technique was designed by Liu et
al. in 2008. In contrast to traditional anomaly detection methods, an isolation
forest explicitly separates anomalies rather than determining normal behavior
and identifying anomalies as deviations from that behavior. This algorithm is
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more effective and efficient in detecting anomalies than commonly used distance-
and density-based methods [6]. In short, an isolation forest determines how long
it takes for each observation to be separated, which is done by continuously
splitting features between their minimum and maximum values. Since the splits
are performed on a feature level, the importance of each feature can be easily
derived. Each isolation tree t ∈ {1, . . . , T} in an isolation forest of T ∈ N trees
yields a path length ht(xi) for every observation xi ∈ RP , i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, with
P the number of features and N the total number of observations. Anomalies are
the records with the smallest average path lengths, because they can be isolated
rapidly.
There are two hyperparameters in an isolation forest: the sub-sampling size
ψ ∈ N, and T . The first parameter controls the training data size per tree,
while the second one determines how many isolation trees are constructed during
training. The anomaly score sN (xi) determines how anomalous observation xi
is. It is defined as
sN (xi) = 2
− h(xi)
c(N) ∈ (0, 1),
where h(xi) = (1/T )
∑T
t=1 ht(xi) is the average path length of xi in the isolation
forest and c(N) = 2HN−1 − 2(N − 1)/N is the expected path length with Hn
the n-th harmonic number. Liu et al. offer some rules of thumb: if sN (xi)  0.5,
then xi can be considered as an anomaly; if sN (i)  0.5, then xi can be regarded
as normal; and if sN (xi) ≈ 0.5, then the status of xi is vague.
One-Class Support Vector Machine. The second unsupervised method
applied in this research was designed by Scho¨lkopf et al. in 1999 [7]. The goal of
this Support Vector Machine (SVM) is to identify one specific class amongst all
observations. This results in trying to separate the observations belonging to the
normal class from the rest of the feature space. Hence, the instances which do not
lie within the non-linear normality boundary are considered to be anomalous.
Therefore, one-class SVM (ocSVM) is a boundary-based algorithm. It has been
shown that such algorithms perform better than density-based techniques, since
they solve a fundamentally easier problem [8]. Consequently, ocSVM is widely
used in the field of anomaly detection.
The goal of ocSVM is to separate the data from the origin with maximum
margin. A mathematical problem (a quadratic program) is solved to determine
the normality boundary, yielding an optimal normal vector w and margin ρ.
There is a hyperparameter ν ∈ [0, 1] acting as a trade-off between the fraction
of anomalies in the data and the number of training examples used as support
vectors [9]. The anomaly score s(xi) of an observation xi is given by
s(xi) = sgn((w · Φ(xi)) − ρ),
where Φ is a map into a dot product space related to the chosen kernel function.
Now, if s(xi) < 0, then xi can be regarded as anomalous; if s(xi) > 0, then xi
can be considered normal; and if s(xi) = 0, then xi is exactly on the boundary
and its status is not determined.
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k-Means Clustering. The third and final anomaly detection technique con-
sidered is a clustering technique. k-means is an unsupervised, iterative algorithm
proposed by Stuart Lloyd in 1957. It is one of the most popular clustering meth-
ods because of its simplicity [10]. In k-means, N observations have to be clus-
tered into k clusters. Each cluster is represented by the mean (centroid) of the
observations it contains. The clustering is performed such that the inter-cluster
similarity is minimized, while the intra-cluster similarity is maximized. The sim-
ilarity is determined by the Euclidean distance of the feature value to the mean
value of the observations in the cluster: the smaller the distances, the higher the
similarity.
The k-means algorithm converges quickly to a local optimum. Here, k ∈ N is a
hyperparameter which, for example, can be determined using the elbow method.
Here, the proportion of explained variance by the model is plotted as a function
of the cluster size k. For small values of k, an increasing k will explain relatively
much additional variance, but less additional variance is explained when k gets
large. The optimal k is the value such that there is a bend in the plot. Now, to
perform anomaly detection, a cluster boundary is introduced for each of the k
clusters. This is a hypersphere around the cluster mean such that 95% of all the
cluster observations are within the sphere, assuming that 5% of the observations
are considered anomalous. For a new observation xi, first the closest cluster is
chosen, and then it is determined whether xi is within the boundary. If it is not,
it can be considered anomalous.
3.4 Data Transformations
Finally, we investigated whether some data transformations had a positive effect
on the anomaly detection performance of the algorithms discussed in Sect. 3.3.
The transformations that were considered are normalization and standardiza-
tion. To normalize the data, the feature values were linearly scaled such that all
values lie in the interval [0, 1]. An advantage of normalization, or min-max scal-
ing, is that each feature contributes equally, since all values are bounded in the
same interval. Consequently, there is no feature overshadowing the other vari-
ables because of its large (absolute) values. However, a disadvantage is that the
dispersion of the data is lost, possibly making it more difficult to detect anoma-
lies. Standardization ensures that each feature has mean 0 and variance 1. The
advantage of standardization over normalization is that the loss of dispersion is
smaller.
Since tree-based models can handle varying feature ranges, normalization
and standardization are not required in an isolation forest. However, the ocSVM
and k-means methods are sensitive to magnitudes, and could therefore benefit
from these transformations.
4 Experimental Setup
As mentioned in Sect. 3.3, there were several hyperparameters which had to be
determined beforehand. For the isolation forest, these constants were the sub-
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sampling size ψ ∈ N and the number of trees T ∈ N. Liu et al. [11] argue
that ψ = 256 and T = 100 are large enough to enable convergence of the
average path length of each observation. Next, the parameter ν in the one-class
Support Vector Machine was chosen to be 0.05, since we assumed that about
5% of the observations were anomalous. The number of clusters k, which was a
hyperparameter for k-means, was determined by the elbow method and varied
for the different experiments that were performed: k = 2 for no modifications,
k = 9 for normalization and k = 38 for standardization. Since there are no labels,
there was no ground truth in the data to which the hyperparameters could be
optimized.
All described procedures were performed in Python 3.6 with the libraries
numPy and Pandas. The results were obtained from an evaluation set. This set
was determined by the anomaly scores calculated by the three discussed ML
methods. For each technique, the anomaly scores of the bookings were ranked in
a descending order. Then, a random subset of 10 bookings was taken from the
top 30, one from the 30 scores around the median, and one from the 30 lowest
scores, yielding a sample of 30 bookings for each anomaly detection method. The
sample observations from the top 30 were predicted to be fraudulent, while the
other observations were considered normal. In total, there were 3 samples of 30
bookings each. There was an overlap between the samples, i.e., the algorithms
ranked some of the observations in the same regions. Hence, they were selected
more than once for the samples. There were 75 unique bookings in the total of 90.
The sample bookings were classified by the domain experts as fraudulent (1) or
normal (0), making it possible to assess the detection power of the algorithms. In
the samples 39 fraudulent bookings were found, while 36 bookings were deemed
normal.
5 Results
5.1 Performance of Anomaly Detection Techniques
To determine the quality of the models, the precision, recall, F1 score and F2
score were calculated. The latter two are given by the formula
Fβ =
(1 + β2) · precision · recall
β2 · precision + recall ,
Table 4. Results with no data transformation on method-specific evaluation samples
Model Precision Recall F1 score F2 score
isolation forest 0.75 0.8 0.774 0.789
ocSVM 0.769 0.588 0.667 0.617
k-means 1 0.444 0.615 0.5
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where β = 1 for the F1 score and β = 2 for the F2 score. The F2 score weighs
recall more than the F1 score does, i.e., it puts more emphasis on false negatives
than false positives. This was done for the unmodified final dataset, which is
the data without normalization or standardization. The performance metrics for
the method-specific samples of size 30 are shown in Table 4. The construction of
these samples is explained in Sect. 4. The isolation forest performed slightly bet-
ter in finding policy violations (recall = 0.8) than making the distinction between
normal and fraudulent observations (precision = 0.75). This was the other way
around for the one-class Support Vector Machine (ocSVM) and k-means cluster-
ing, since both techniques had a higher precision than recall. Both the F1 and F2
scores suggest that the isolation forest performed the best. In fraud detection,
reducing false negatives is usually more important than reducing false positives,
since missing a fraudulent observation is deemed more harmful than raising a
false alarm. False positives only bother domain experts with extra investigation
time, while false negatives result in a potentially large loss of revenue. Hence,
the F2 score better represents how desirably the anomaly detection method
performed. Note that this evaluation was done on the different method-specific
samples. Although there is some overlap between them, a direct comparison of
the performance measures is risky.
Table 5. Results with no data transformation on complete evaluation sample.
Model Precision Recall F1 score F2 score
isolation forest 0.706 0.615 0.657 0.632
ocSVM 0.75 0.462 0.571 0.5
k-means 0.8 0.308 0.444 0.351
The three ML methods were also applied to the complete evaluation sample.
This set is the combination of the three method-specific samples of 30 observa-
tions each. The complete sample consists of 75 unique bookings. The results for
the data with no modifications are presented in Table 5. The performance of the
methods is comparable to the results on the method-specific samples in terms of
F1 and F2 score. The isolation forest still ranks the best (F2 = 0.632), followed
by the ocSVM (F2 = 0.5) and k-means clustering (F2 = 0.351). This compar-
ison was based on the same sample for each technique, thus strengthening the
claims. Since there are 39 actual fraudulent bookings and 36 normal instances,
the F2 score is expected to be approximately 0.503 when the predicted labels are
assigned by unbiased coin flips. This means only the isolation forest performed
better than this threshold value.
The normalization and standardization procedures had remarkable influences
on the results, as can be seen in Tables 6 and 7. For the method-specific samples,
the precision and recall are both 0 for the isolation forest and ocSVM, performing
severely worse than without data transformations. This was expected to some
extent for the isolation forest, since the segregation of the observations is done
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Table 6. Results on transformed method-specific evaluation data.
Model Normalized Standardized
Prec. Recall F1 F2 Prec. Recall F1 F2
isolation forest 0 0 0 0 1 0.067 0.125 0.082
ocSVM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
k-means 0.909 0.556 0.690 0.602 0.8 0.444 0.571 0.488
Table 7. Results on transformed complete evaluation data.
Normalized Standardized
Model Prec. Recall F1 F2 Prec. Recall F1 F2
isolation forest 1 0.026 0.05 0.032 0.5 0.077 0.133 0.093
ocSVM 0.5 0.026 0.049 0.032 1 0.026 0.05 0.032
k-means 0.742 0.590 0.657 0.615 0.786 0.564 0.657 0.598
more rapidly with large variations in the data. However, this was not expected
for the ocSVM. According to literature, transforming the data should benefit
an SVM. This could be due to the Gaussian radial basis function that we used
in this research. Nevertheless, the performance of k-means clustering increased
from F2 = 0.5 to F2 = 0.602 with normalization. There was a slight decrease for
standardization from F2 = 0.5 to F2 = 0.488.
For the combined sample, the performance of all three considered anomaly
detection methods moderately increased in terms of F2 score compared to the
method-specific samples. In short, the isolation forest performed the best on its
own sample of 30 observations without any data transformations (F2 = 0.789).
This was also the case for the one-class SVM (F2 = 0.617). k-Means clustering
performed the best on the complete evaluation sample with normalized data
(F2 = 0.615). Note that all these values are larger than the threshold value of
0.503.
5.2 Feature Evaluation
The results of the anomaly detection methods and the advise of the domain
experts allowed us to construct a set of features which were deemed to be the
most likely to identify suspicious behavior of an OTA. The list of the five most
important features is given in Table 8. The first feature indicates the sum of






where S is the number of flight segments in the booking. We expect the sum
to equal the triangular number (and so the feature value to be 1), since the
segments are usually labeled in an ascending order from 1 to S. The order ratio
feature is not equal to 1 for the booking shown in Table 2, because flight seg-
ments have been canceled. The second variable is related to PoC circumvention.
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As discussed in Sect. 3.2, the fact that PoC circumvention has occurred could
indicate fraudulent behavior. We also showed in Tables 1 and 2 how the number
of cancellations, which is the third most important feature, could be connected
to fraud. The fourth feature has not been discussed in the feature analysis, but
an unexpected value of this feature also suggests malicious behavior. Finally, the
last feature in Table 8 indicates whether the OTA creating the booking is not
equal to the OTA owning it.
Table 8. List of features to identify suspicious activity.




Number of booking class switches
Number of OTA owners which are unequal to the creator
6 Discussion and Conclusion
The goal of this research was to discover policy violations conducted by OTAs
with the use of three anomaly detection methods. To this end, the raw data was
analyzed and new variables were constructed to better describe the behavior of
the OTAs. We demonstrated that these new features were important in detecting
fraudulent bookings. This encourages domain experts to monitor these variables
to detect some of the fraudulent behavior and avoid revenue loss. Moreover, this
advises an airline organization to update its policy agreement with the OTAs to
prevent such malpractices from happening in the future.
Together with the domain experts, we concluded that most of the anoma-
lies were caused by cancellation activity in the bookings, suggesting that the
values of the features corresponding to this behavior give a strong indication of
fraud. However, there were instances in which normal bookings were detected
as fraudulent, which happened because of complex and highly unusual flights.
Also, there were instances in which the domain experts marked a booking as
fraudulent, but it was based on a gut feeling. Here, the benefit of using unsuper-
vised ML becomes evident: these bookings would never have been found when
the bookings were only analyzed on a feature-based level. Moreover, since we
were not able to find literature about this research field, we took an important
step in understanding fraudulent behavior conducted by OTAs.
One of our suggestions for future research is to broaden the scope to make
the results more generalizable. Firstly, we considered the bookings of one airline
market. It is possible that the behavior of OTAs is significantly different for
another market. Secondly, because of time constraints, only 75 records (≈0.42%)
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were analyzed by the domain experts. This means the results could be notably
different when a new sample is considered. Another suggestion for future research
is to find out at which stage in the booking process the models are able to detect
fraud in an online setting.
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